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ON MUSSO'S RETURN
(Translator's Introduction)
It is now almost thirty-five years since Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indone­
sia's independence. The men and women who were their comrades-in-arms in the 
pergerakan o f the late colonial period are mostly dead and gone. Yet in some ways 
the lives, experiences, and conceptions of the pergerakan leaders in that period 
may be more accessible than those of the succeeding generation. They were in 
the habit of writing, in part because they were always far from power, in part be­
cause the pergerakan was as much a matter of ideas as it was of organization. And 
the pace of events in the 1930s often seemed frustratingly slow; time hung heavy 
on many people's hands, at home and in exile. Moreover, a number of the promi­
nent figures from that period have found the will and the time to leave autobiogra­
phies for succeeding generations. Few though these texts are, they are varied 
enough in content and perspective that there is not much danger of students of 
Indonesian history getting a fundamentally one-sided conception of that era.
With the coming of the Japanese, and especially with the outbreak of the revo­
lution, almost everything changed. Events moved at break-neck speed. The men 
of the pergerakan—and a younger generation—were catapulted overnight into 
power. They now made decisions, not protests. They stood to lose, not argu­
ments, but their own lives. Perhaps because it was a time of action, the revolu­
tion produced no great works—outside the breathtaking fiction of Pramudya Ananta 
Tur. Sukarno's collected speeches contain no items from the revolution. Indone­
sia's three prime ministers during the revolution (Sjahrir, Amir Sjarifuddin, and 
Hatta) left no fundamental tex ts .1 Because paper was very scarce and of poor 
quality, less was written, and it disintegrated faster than in earlier times. The 
ravages of war also destroyed much unique documentary material.2 Furthermore, 
a number of the leading personalities of the revolutionary period—men like Amir 
Sjarifuddin, Tan Malaka, and General Sudirman—died or were killed during its 
tumult or immediately afterwards. Memoirs of the revolution—in books like Ali 
Sastroamidjojo's Tonggak-tonggak di Perjalananku, Abu Hanifah's Tales of a Revo­
lution , Soekamto Sajidiman's The Tender Power, and Simatupang's Report from 
Banaran, are fragmentary and only marginally representative.
As a result, the revolution is in many ways a period more obscure than the era 
of the pergerakan, though it is closer to our own, and many of its participants sur­
vive, indeed hold the highest positions of political power in Indonesia. And of all 
the major episodes in the revolution, none is more obscure than what has gone down 
to history as the Madiun Affair. To my knowledge, only two serious scholarly 
works, both in English, have covered the whole A ffair.3 On the Indonesian side,
1. Except for Our Struggle, written before Sjahrir came to power.
2. For example, most of the government archives were destroyed. Most Republi­
can newspapers still in existence for the crucial year 1947-48 are now only to be 
found in Yogyakarta.
3. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca:
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the obscurity derives less from lack of attention than from the strongly partisan 
nature of nearly all accounts.* The Affair has always aroused fierce emotions and 
bitter memories. For its outcome not only determined the kind of merdeka that In­
donesia would inherit in the 1950s, but it was very costly in terms of Indonesian 
lives. From the start, there was an inevitable imbalance in the accounts in that 
so many leaders of the FDR (People's Democratic Front)—the losing side in the 
Affair—were killed in battle or executed in its aftermath, and so had no chance to 
record their views and experiences. Subsequently, two other factors accentuated 
this imbalance. First, and most important, has been the fact that since 1965 it has 
been impossible for Indonesians on the left to publish anything in their own coun­
try, let alone anything on the Madiun Affair. Secondly, the political and moral 
ethos of the left, above all the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), seems to have 
discouraged the publication of personal memoirs and accounts. 4 5
Under these circumstances, Mr. Soerjono's personal memoir, written in the 
form of a letter in response to the translator's enquiries, is a significant addition 
to the historical record: it is, I believe, the first unofficial, personal account of 
the background to the Madiun Affair from a left-wing perspective. It is to be 
hoped that its publication will stimulate others to follow Mr. Soerjono's example.
Its publication in Indonesia stems from two considerations beyond the text's intrin­
sic value. First, the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project and Southeast Asia Program 
have a long tradition of publishing translations of first-hand accounts of episodes 
in modern Indonesian history. Second, under present circumstances, it is not 
easy to see where else Mr. Soerjono's account could appear.
To preserve as far as possible the informal flavor of the original Indonesian 
letter, the translator has made only minor alterations to eliminate redundancies, 
clarify the chronology, and standardize the spelling of personal names. Rather 
extensive footnotes have been added to guide the reader unfamiliar with the period 
of the Affair, since Mr. Soerjono's text assumes considerable familiarity with events 
and personalities on the reader's part. The author's own footnotes are indicated 
by asterisks and those of the translator are numbered. Square brackets in the 
text are the translator's interpolations. English language words used by Soerjono 
in the original text are written in this italic type.
Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 256-303; Elizabeth Ann Swift, "Madiun"
(M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1979). Additional information on the Affair 
can be found in David Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," 
Indonesia, 21 (April 1976), pp. 1-64; and Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri dari sebuah 
Djalan (Pemberontakan PKI di Madiun September 1948)" (M.A. thesis, University 
of Indonesia, 1969). None of these made use of the documentation available in 
Yogyakarta.
4. These include: Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Aidit Accuses Madiun Affair (Jakarta: 
Pembaruan, 1955); M. Isa Anshary, Sjarif Usman, and Jusuf Wibisono, Bahaja 
Merah di Indonesia [Red Threat in Indonesia] (Bandung: Front Anti-Komunis,
1955); Djamal Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun (Jakarta: Merdeka Press, 1966); H. A. 
Notosoetardjo, Peristiwa Madiun Tragedi Nasional (Jakarta: Api Islam, 1966); 
Pinardi, Peristiwa Coup Berdarah PKI September 1948 di Madiun (Jakarta: Inkopak- 
Hazera, 1967).
5. The only memoirs by Indonesian Communists are those of "eccentrics" such as 
Tan Malaka's Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara and Alimin Prawirodirdjo's Riwajat Hidup 
Alimin.
ON MUSSO'S RETURN
(Written in answer to questions by Bung Ben Anderson)
By Soerjono
Translated by Ben Anderson
It was a long time ago that you wrote to me asking about Musso's arrival. 
Among the questions you raised was why Musso's political line was so quickly ac­
cepted by the leaders of the FDR [Front Demokrasi Rakjat—People's Democratic 
Front]. Was it because they had lost hope as a result of the failure of their oppo­
sition [to the Hatta government]?
As I see it, that was not the case. For it is now a fact of history, and can be 
stated confidently as such, that all the leaders of the FDR, from Amir Sjarifuddin1 
down to the generation of Aidit2 and Sudisman3 (who were then members of the 
younger generation in the FDR), underwent the history of their struggle until 
death without ever losing hope.
So it was not a question of any loss of hope. And as to why Musso's political 
line was so quickly accepted, Amir Sjarifuddin's statement at one or other FDR 
plenum (the term for plenum at that time was "madjelis lengkap" [full council]) in 
August, after Musso's arrival, comes closer to the truth. What Bung Amir then 
said was: "The arrival of oude heer [Old Man] Musso means a versnelling [speed­
ing up] of a process which was already developing among us." As you know, 
Musso arrived at the beginning of August, 1948. By then, Amir Sjarifuddin had 
long since resigned as prime minister.
1. Amir Sjarifuddin (1907-1948) was a student activist before World War II, was 
imprisoned by the Japanese for underground activities during the war, and during 
the revolution was a top leader of the Socialist Party, minister of defense (1945- 
1948) and prime minister (1947-1948). He was executed by government forces in 
December 1948.
2. D. N. Aidit (1923-1965) came to prominence in the early revolution as a leader 
and parliamentary spokesman for the Indonesian Communist Party. After the fu­
sion of the FDR's components into the new Musso-led Communist Party, he became 
a member of its Politbureau. He was killed by government troops in October 1965.
3. Sudisman (1920-1967) had been a nationalist militant in the prewar years. Dur­
ing the early revolution he was a leading figure in the leftwing paramilitary youth 
organization Pesindo (Socialist Youth of Indonesia). In the expanded Musso-led 
PKI of September 1948, he headed the organization secretariat of the Politbureau. 
He was sentenced to death for his alleged role in the October 1, 1965 coup and 
executed in 1967.
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In my view, things might have developed differently in the archipelago if  
Musso had come earlier, in other words, if he had come before the Amir S jarifud- 
din Cabinet resigned. It would have been easier to solve the basic problems of 
the Indonesian revolution, including the mistakes of the FDR, with Amir Sjarifud- 
din in the government, rather than trying to correct those mistakes when the FDR 
was in opposition outside the government.
In this connection, you should realize that even before Amir Sjarifuddin re­
signed , there were signs of rethinking among the FDR leaders themselves, espe­
cially among those leaders who lived close to the center of political developments 
in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In those days the term "otokritik" [self-criticism] 
was not much used and was not yet in vogue. But this change in conceptions, or 
process of rethinking, manifested itself publicly in certain organizational changes. 
The name Sajap Kiri [Left Wing] became Front Demokrasi Rakjat. Its offices, 
housed at Jl. Gondolayu 13 in Yogyakarta, which were originally known as the 
Sajap Kiri secretariat, became the FDR secretariat. These changes were not 
simply changes of names, but were also at the same time manifestations o f a pro­
cess of introspection going on among groups which had long been plagued by sec­
tarianism , which, within certain limits, had caused harm to the ranks of the pro­
gressives and revolutionaries themselves.
Moreover, in connection with the policy o f compromising with the Dutch, the 
name Sajap Kiri had too long been the target of hostile propaganda by groups who 
claimed to be further to the "left,” * i .e . , the Tan Malaka people, including Ibnu 
Pam a.4 5
It can't be denied any longer that this change of name was not just a change 
of words on a signboard. The FDR was a continuation of, but it was also not the 
same as, the Sajap Kiri. The birth of the FDR came in February 1948.
The public change of name brought with it internal consequences, in particu­
lar an improvement in work-methods. In the period of the Sajap Kiri, i . e . , before 
the FDR was born, the most important problems were worked out within the 
Sjahrir-Amir inner circle, i . e . , in the Socialist Party's Party Council. As a result, 
the Sajap Kiri's secretariat in practice only called a meeting when a Special Train 
came in by night from Jakarta, meaning that Prime Minister Sjahrir had come to 
Yogyakarta, the capital of the Republic. As prime minister, he stayed longer and 
more often in Betawi or Batavia than in Yogyakarta. 6 All this meant that when he
* Kirei is a Japanese-language term for the Japanese-style bow of respect. The 
Sajap Kiri was ridiculed as the Siap Kirei, meaning "ready to bow to the Dutch."
I learned subsequently that this particular agitation originated with Ibnu Parna, 
leader of Akoma [Angkatan Komunis Muda—Young Communist Generation].
4. Amir's cabinet resigned on January 23, 1948. Musso arrived in Java on 
August 11 of that year.
5. Ibnu Parna (b . 1920) came to public attention at the start of the revolution as 
a miHtantly nationalist leftwing youth leader, first in AMRI (Young Generation of 
the Indonesian Republic) in Semarang, later in Pesindo. He was a leading figure 
in Tan Malaka's radical opposition movement, the Persatuan Perdjuangan, in 1946, 
and was arrested by the Sjahrir-Amir government on charges of subversion after 
the July 3, 1946 Affair. In the meantime he had founded the Akoma, which sur­
vived into the 1950s.
6. Throughout his tenure as prime minister (November 1945-June 1947), Sjahrir 
also held the portfolio of foreign affairs. Necessarily, he spent much of his time 
negotiating with the Dutch in Jakarta.
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arrived in Yogyakarta, the results of his negotiations with the Dutch were first 
talked out in the Socialist Party's Party Council on Jl. Mahameru, and only then 
presented as a fait accompli to the madjelis lengkap of the Sajap Kiri. At that time 
the Sajap Kiri madjelis lengkap consisted of the permanent staff of the secretariat 
plus representatives of the member parties and organizations. These were: Tan 
Ling Djie7 and Mr. Abdulmadjid Djojoadiningrat, 8 representing the Socialist Party; 
Drs. Setiadjid,9 Asmu,10 Musirin11 and S. K. Trimurti,12 representing the Labor 
Party; Maruto Darusman13 14and Sutrisno, llt representing the central committee of 
the Bintaran Communist Party [PKI-Bintaran]15 (in addition there was also an 
illegal PKI); Sudisman, Soerjono,16 and Lagiono,17 representing Pesindo; Njono18
7. Tan Ling Djie (1904-1965?) started his political career in the Partai Tionghoa 
Indonesia (PTI—Indonesian Chinese Party) and as an editor of Sin Tit Po in the 
later 1930s. During the early revolution he became secretary-general of the Social­
ist Party. He later became a member of the general secretariat and the Politbureau 
of Musso's expanded PKI. He was killed in Kalisosok prison, Surabaya, in 1965 or 
1966.
8. Abdulmadjid Djojoadiningrat (b. 1904), an aristocrat closely related to Kartini, 
was active in leftwing politics while a student in Holland in the late 1930s. On his 
return to Indonesia he became a top leader of the Socialist Party. Earlier he had 
been a member of the Dutch Communist Party's central executive.
9. Setiadjid, like Abdulmadjid, was an aristocrat who was active in leftwing pol­
itics while a student in Holland before and during the war. On his return to Indo­
nesia in 1946, he became a leader of the Indonesian Labor Party. He disappeared 
in the aftermath of the Madiun Affair, but is believed to have been killed.
10. Asmu, reportedly a member of the Indonesian Labor Party at this time, was to 
become Chairman of the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia—Indonesian Peasants' League) 
in the late 1950s.
11. Musirin Sosrosubroto (b. 1901) was active in dockworkers' and seamen's 
unions in the early 1920s. In the wake of the Communist uprisings of 1926-27, he 
was banished to Boven Digul. On his return to Indonesia after the war, he was 
active again in labor unions and the Indonesian Labor Party.
12. S. K. Trimurti (b. 1914), one of the most prominent female journalists and 
political figures of the prewar nationalist movement, became a top leader of the 
Indonesian Labor Party in 1946.
13. Maruto Darusman was, like Setiadjid and Abdulmadjid, an aristocrat who be­
came involved in leftwing activities in Holland before the war. Like them, he was 
active in the anti-Nazi underground. On his return to Indonesia in 1946, he joined 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In the expanded Musso-led party o f Sep­
tember 1948 he was a member o f the general secretariat and the Politbureau. He 
was executed along with Amir Sjarifuddin and others in December 1948.
14. Sutrisno was a labor organizer and member of the underground Communist 
Party of the 1930s, and was among those arrested by the Japanese for Communist 
subversion in 1944. After the Proclamation of Independence he was released, and 
joined, first, the Socialist Party, and later the PKI.
15. PKI-Bintaran or Bintaran PKI—a contemporary colloquialism for the official 
PKI of the 1946-47 period, which had its offices in Bintaran, Yogyakarta.
16. Soerjono—this is probably the pemuda leader popularly known later as Pak 
Kasur, who was first active in Bandung in 1945, and, afterwards, a top leader of 
Pesindo's defense section.
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representing SOBSI; Ir. Sakirman17 89 representing the Lasjkar Rakjat (excluding 
the West Java Lasjkar Rakjat which was led by Chaerul Saleh20 and Armunanto21) . 
The result was that in practice the Sjahrir-Amir inner circle, then still united 
within the Socialist Party's party council, was the "policy-maker" of the federation, 
even though Tan lin g  Djie was simultaneously secretary-general of the Socialist 
Party and o f the illegal CCPKI, and Amir Sjarifuddin, Abdulmadjid, Maruto Darus- 
man, and Setiadjid were all members o f the Politbureau of the illegal CCPKI which 
controlled the Bintaran CCPKI.
Ministerial beleid [policy] was never brought up for discussion in the Sajap 
Kiri's madjelis lengkap, but was talked out in each component party's leadership. 
The secretariat only invited representatives of the parties and organizations if 
there was a major question at issue, above all with regard to negotiations with the 
Dutch.
With the birth of the FDR, the secretariat took a more active role, as did the 
madjelis lengkap, on which each member organization had a permanent representa­
tive.
It turned out later on that this new work-style produced new thinking. In 
other words, there was more possibility for a horizontal exchange of ideas, direct 
and on a daily basis, between the functionaries of the various organizations con­
tained within the FDR. Many of the older generation who had positions in the mass 
organizations and had direct contact with the broad masses carried out flashbacks. 
Many high-ranking leadership cadres, who previously had been mainly involved 
with the problems of the executive, began to be able to see various issues 
more clearly,now that they were outside the cabinet. Many of them began to talk 
about the "November Belofte" [November Promises]—a promise o f administrative 
changes which the Dutch Indies never fulfilled. 22 They also began to speak quite
17. Lagiono was a prominent youth leader in Yogyakarta after the Proclamation of 
Independence, and co-author with Aidit, Wikana, and Mustapha of Dokumentasi 
Pemuda: Sekitar Proklamasi Merdeka (Yogyakarta: Pusat SBPI, June 1948).
18. Njono (1922-1966) first came to public notice as a labor leader in the fall of 
1945 in Jakarta. Thereafter, he was a key figure in SOBSI (All-Indonesian Labor 
Union Federation) , during the revolution and afterwards. He was sentenced to 
death for his alleged role in the October 1, 1965 coup, and executed in 1966.
19. Sakirman (1911-1966) achieved fame first as leader of the Lasjkar Rakjat 
(People's Militia) in Central Java after 1945. In the 1950s he became a top leader 
of the PKI and was "shot while attempting to escape from prison" in 1966.
20. Chaerul Saleh (1916-1967), already active in nationalist student politics in 
the 1930s, became one of the most charismatic and controversial pemuda figures of 
the revolution. A hero o f the Proclamation o f Independence events, briefly a top 
Pesindo leader, later a follower of Tan Malaka, he was jailed for his purported 
association with the July 3, 1946 coup. On his release, he and Armunanto led the 
West Java People's Militia, which was much more radical and anti-Dutch than Sakir­
man's in Central Java. Imprisoned in 1966 for his support for Sukarno, he died 
soon afterwards while still in custody.
21. Armunanto was in the period 1945-47 a close associate o f Chaerul Saleh.
22. In November 1918 severe revolutionary disturbances seemed likely to spread 
from Germany into Holland. So alarmed was the Governor-General of the Nether­
lands Indies, van Limburg Stirum, by news of these developments that he appeared 
before the largely impotent colonial legislature, the Volksraad, and promised rapid
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frankly about the Sutardjo Petition in the days of the Volksraad. 23 24 This petition 
had simply "demanded" that natives be given high administrative positions within 
the framework of the Dutch Indies Government. The aim being simply to improve 
the efficiency of the Dutch administration. Not to determine policy, but merely to 
carry it out, for policy-determination would remain with the Dutch Indies Governor 
[sic]. Even this petition was rejected [by the Dutch]. It's not surprising that 
even then the people began to ridicule the name Volksraad by nicknaming it "Volk 
Sekarat" [The People are at Death's Door]. 2l* Then there came the "Visman Com­
mission,"25 a commission headed by Mr. Visman, without any power, but assigned 
the task of "discussing" with representatives of the National Political Parties to 
hear their demands. After listening, it rushed to file away the demands for Indo­
nesian independence in its desk drawer. The single concession made by the Dutch 
colonial government to the Indonesian people at that time was that Indonesians in 
the Volksraad would be allowed to refer to their people and their country using,in 
place of "native," the word "Indonesian." A word which Mr. Jonkman26 himself 
was already using while still an Indology student in Holland.
Among the FDR leaders many began to ask themselves: "Are we really on the 
right road? If we want independence, why in the world do we have to negotiate 
for it with the Dutch? When every demand, from the November Promises to the 
Sutardjo Petition (which merely pressed for high official positions and didn't ask 
for independence) was always rejected—let alone what we are demanding now?" In 
going through this kind of introspection, many began to feel that something had 
been wrong all along.
For example, they'd learned by heart that the present stage of the revolution 
was the antifeudal and antiimperialist bourgeois democratic revolution. Yet in the 
Working Committee of the Central National Committee (KNIP) , which formed the 
provisional parliament of the Republic, Socialist Party representative and Minister 
of the Interior Mr. Abdulmadjid rejected the Mangunsarkoro motion demanding the 
liquidation of the Yogyakarta Sultanate as a Special Region. In this way, the 
antifeudal banner in that stage of the revolution was dropped by a representative 
of a Marxist Party like Mr. Abdulmadjid, and picked up by a Taman Siswa school­
teacher representing the Marhaenists, Ki Mangunsarkoro,27 and flown in the name
and far-reaching reforms. These promises were, needless to say, mostly broken 
once the panic subsided, but they lived on in bitter folk-memory as the November- 
Belofte.
23. The Sutardjo Petition, passed by a 26-20 majority of the Volksraad, in mid- 
1936, asked for a conference to be held to discuss Indonesia's evolution towards 
self-government over a ten-year period within the framework of the Dutch Consti­
tution. It was rejected out of hand by the colonial authorities.
24. The reference is to the miserable conditions prevailing among the people dur­
ing the worst years of the Great Depression.
25. This Visman Commission was set up under the chairmanship of F. H. Visman 
of the Council of the Indies in late 1940.
26. Jan Jonkman, one of the best-known products o f the Leiden University Indo- 
logical faculty, had a distinguished career in the last years of the Netherlands 
Indies, ending as chairman of the Volksraad in 1939. After the war, he was Hol­
land's second minister for overseas territories, and was a key figure in the sign­
ing and later disintegration of the Linggadjati Agreement (1946). He was also a 
member of the prewar "Stuw"-group of colonial liberals.
27. Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro (1904-1957), long active in the nationalist Taman
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of the PNI. Prominent among those who saw this problem clearly and spoke about 
it frankly in his own way, was Sardjono Petruk. He was a peasant, and his lan­
guage and his approach to problems were typical of a peasant. By the feudal 
standards o f Yogyakarta or Surakarta he was perhaps rather kasar, but the way 
he spoke and his method of approaching problems was straight and open.
In addition to all this, it cannot be denied that at that time the "motor" of the 
FDR secretariat was in the hands of the younger generation, namely Aidit, Njoto,28 
and Sudisman. At that time Lukman29 was quite removed from the FDR because he 
was busy every day running the journal Bintang Merah [Red Star] in Bintaran, 
Yogyakarta.
I remember how once, in 1947, at his house in Jl. Kan til Baciro, Yogyakarta, 
Sudisman urged me to read a text by Sharkey, 30 31a leader of the Australian Commu­
nist Party, on the need for "new forces" to develop in the Party. I asked him: 
"Why do you recommend this book, Mas Dis?" "Well, in this book Comrade Sharkey 
talks about the need for developing and stimulating new forces in the Party."
"What does he mean by new forces?" "A younger generation in the Party." He 
made this recommendation to me a little while before the Amir Cabinet resigned.
For a long time after that I never saw the book. But from friends I heard that it 
really existed, and had been brought back by Indonesian friends who had recently 
returned from Australia. And from that time on I sensed that intensive discussions 
were going on among the people whose names I have just mentioned. It is unde­
niable that the quartet Aidit-Lukman-Njoto-Sudisman was born in the period of the 
FDR secretariat, with the note that at that time Sudisman was the most senior.
For simplicity's sake we can call this younger group, and the various leaders 
who were beginning to carry out introspection, "locally-produced cadres." Most 
of them were pejuang or people in the pergerakan31 at the end of the Dutch Indies 
period, who then continued their struggle under the Japanese. Except for Njoto,
Siswa private school system in colonial times, as well as a leading figure in the 
nationalist parties PNI, Partindo,and Gerindo, before the war, became a spokes­
man for the radical wing of the PNI in the revolutionary period. He was particu­
larly active in the oppositional campaigns for the elimination of the traditional 
feudal monarchies in Central Java, which, for complex reasons, the Socialist gov­
ernments of Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin (1945-1948) did much to protect. "Mar- 
haenists"is a colloquialism for members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) 
and its associated organizations.
28. Njoto (1925-1965) came to prominence in the revolutionary period as a young 
PKI intellectual and parliamentary spokesman. At the age of 23, he became a mem­
ber of the Musso-led PKI's secretariat and Politbureau, having earlier served on 
the FDR secretariat. He was killed by the military in the aftermath of the October 
1, 1965 coup.
29. M. H. Lukman (1920-1965), a leading member of the young generation of 
postwar Indonesian Communists, was active in the PKI from 1946 on, with special 
responsibility for the party journal Bintang Merah. Like Aidit and Njoto, he was 
summarily killed in the aftermath of the October 1, 1965 coup.
30. L. L. Sharkey was a principal leader of the Australian Communist Party from 
1930 to the early 1950s.
31. Pejuang and pergerakan are key political terms from the period of national 
independence struggle but are difficult to translate. Pejuang roughly means "free­
dom-fighter" and pergerakan "the Movement."
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who was a complete "newcomer."  They were born and grew up in the midst of 
Indonesian society, and were inured to living in hardship during the Japanese 
occupation. At the same time, these people were extremely isolated from interna­
tional developments during the Second World War. They only really became ac­
quainted with the literature of Marxism after the revolution broke out, when 
former prisoners in Boven Digul came home via Australia, bringing with them books 
published by the Australian Communists; and when Indonesians returning from Hol­
land after the Proclamation of Independence brought back with them books issued 
by the CPN. 32 Thus they had the advantage of knowing a great deal about Indo­
nesian society, but also the weakness, at that time, of as yet being unable to 
formulate their experience theoretically.
Correct thinking, and turning that thinking into a struggle program are two 
separate things, and the journey between them sometimes requires a long struggle 
with many twists and turns.
Aside from these "locally-produced cadres," there were also "old cracks"33 34
from Australia within the body of the FDR. This group consisted of the "Genera­
tion of '26" and the "Generation of '35" (Central Committee members recruited by 
Musso when he slipped back into Indonesia in those years). Most of these people 
came, not from the intelligentsia, but from the Rakyat jelata [the common people], 
steeled by their sufferings in the jungles of Boven Digul, and then evacuated by 
the Dutch to Australia, because of the Second World War, and put to work as 
unskilled labor at various Allied military installations. There, through their con­
tacts with the Australian Workers, they began to get acquainted with the litera­
ture or the theories of Marxism. But they too had their shortcomings alongside 
their advantages. Because they originated from the Rakyat, their class-conscious­
ness was sharp, their solidariteit was strong, and they were free from the disease 
of careerism in the struggle. Their weaknesses were that they had been away 
from Indonesia for too long; they'd studied a bit of Marxist theory, but in isola­
tion from concrete social problems and the central problems of the Indonesian 
revolution.
After the PKI Congress in Solo,31f during the revolution, when Sardjono,35 
Ngadiman,36 and Djokosudjono37 assumed leadership of the legal PKI, they mostly 
or mainly swarmed round the PKI, which had its office at Bintaran, Yogyakarta.
32. CPN—Communist Party of the Netherlands.
33. "Old cracks"—a common phrase in modern Indonesian—seems to be derived 
from a Dutch misconception that this is an echt-English sporty phrase.
34. This Congress took place on April 29, 1946, and it saw the return to leader­
ship of many veterans of the 1926-27 rebellion who had been in Boven Digul and 
Australia.
35. Sardjono had been chairman of the PKI in 1926, and was arrested and exiled 
to Boven Digul before the rebellion of that year broke out. He was among those 
executed along with Amir Sjarifuddin in December 1948.
36. Ngadiman, another Communist from prewar days, became a member of the 
general secretariat of the Musso-led PKI in 1948, and o f its Politbureau, and was 
executed with Amir, Sardjono, and others in December 1948.
37. Djokosudjono (b. 1912) was recruited into the underground PKI of 1935 by 
Musso, having earlier been active in nationalist organizations. In 1938 he was 
arrested and interned by the Dutch in Boven Digul. He spent the war years in 
Australia and returned to Indonesia in 1946.
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In addition, there were those whom people called the "groep from Holland."
Most of these were intellectuals, with a small additional group of ex-sailors, who 
were studying or working in Holland before World War II broke out.
Aside from the small group of ex-sailors, most of those who set off to study in 
Holland before the Second World War came from families of aristocrats, or priyayi, 
or rich merchants from Java or Sumatra. As one striking example, take the case 
of Jusuf Muda Dalam. 38 He was a student from Aceh, came from a rich family, and 
when he set off he didn't forget to take with him, along with his clothes, . . . a 
prayer mat. When they left Indonesia they did so under the intellectual influence 
of the blazing-up of the Indonesian nationalist movement. In Holland they started 
to get acquainted with Western democracy. They began to frown in surprise when 
they noticed how the progressive newspapers in Holland defended the struggle of 
the Indonesian people, and when they observed the debates in the Dutch Lower 
House, where the Dutch Communists sharply denounced Dutch colonialism in Indo­
nesia. Whereas, if Indonesians were to say exactly the same thing in Indonesia, 
the Dutch would throw them into jails like Glodok, or Cipinang, or banish them to 
the jungles of Boven Digul. Later on they noticed how, when there was an up­
rising of the Indonesian workers on the ship "Zeven Provineien," 39 40the Dutch 
Communists stoutly defended these sailors. As intellectuals they reflected on all 
this and began to learn about Marxism, which subsequently changed their whole 
view of the world; they changed themselves before they developed the ideal o f 
changing Indonesian society.
They began to understand the nature of Dutch colonialism in a more systematic 
way. And in addition, during the Second World War, they "got training" from 
their experience of Nazi cruelty. Many of them joined the antifascist struggle 
against the Germans. So it was that after the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, 
i.e . , after World War II ended with the defeat of Japan, many of them went home 
to struggle for the freedom of their country. And thus, when units of Dutch colo­
nial troops disembarked at Jakarta at the beginning of 1946, among them were Indo­
nesians in Royal Army uniforms who then made contact with the headquarters of 
API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia—Indonesian Younger Generation)lf0 at Menteng 31, 
Jakarta, which was then headed by Wikana.41
Among the first people to come to API headquarters was Mr. Abdulmadjid, 
former head of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI—Indonesian Association).42 He was
38. Jusuf Muda Dalam (1914-1976) was involved in the leftwing anti-Nazi under­
ground during the war. On his return to Indonesia he became an official in the 
defense ministry under Amir, and eventually a member of the PKI. In 1954, he 
switched to the PNI.
39. This celebrated mutiny took place in January 1933.
40. API was the leading pemuda organization in Jakarta after the Proclamation of 
Independence, and included virtually all the pemuda leaders o f any reputation.
41. Wikana (1914-1966) was a prominent youthful activist in Gerindo just before 
the war, and also had close personal ties to Sukarno. During the Japanese Occu­
pation he engaged in underground activities and was a leading participant in the 
crisis of the Proclamation of Independence. He led API in 1945 and later became a 
top Pesindo leader when API merged with other leftwing youth groups to form 
this organization. He sat on the youth secretariat and the Politbureau of the 
Musso-led PKI o f September 1948. He "disappeared" during the massacres of 
1965-66.
42. Perhimpunan Indonesia was the main organization of nationalist Indonesian
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sent straight on to Yogyakarta. Subsequently, Drs. Setiadjid, Drs. Maruto Darus- 
man, Gondopratomo, Ir. Thaher Thajety3 and others also showed up in Yogyakarta. 
By comparison with those FDR leadership cadres who were "local products," or 
"old cracks" from Boven Digul and Australia, most of the returnees from Holland 
had some superiority in the field of theory or at least in book knowledge of Marx­
ism. This is understandable, since their intellectual level was quite high by com­
parison with either the "local products" or the "old cracks."  Or at least their 
knowledge o f languages was richer, and this made it possible for them to read the 
works of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, and the products of advanced thinking in West­
ern Europe in general, and Holland in particular. Some of them, such as Mr. 
Abdulmadjid and Tan lin g  Djie, had had the opportunity to go with Mr. Iwa Kusu- 
masumantri1*1* to study Marxism-Leninism at the Oriental Institute in Moscow in the 
period o f the Comintern. As a result, the level of their theoretical knowledge of 
Marxism was relatively higher, and their view of the international situation and the 
anatomy of Dutch colonialism were relatively broader.
In Holland most of them had been active in the PI. Before the war, the PI was 
acknowledged and even entitled by many echelons of the nationalist movement in 
Indonesia as "the front-line post in the freedom struggle of the Indonesian People 
against Dutch colonialism." Nonetheless, even this group was not free of handicaps. 
On the whole, they came from the upper strata of Indonesian society; they had 
been away from Indonesia for a long time; and when they'd left Indonesia decades 
before, their knowledge of Indonesian society was still very inadequate.
It i s , o f course, true that those who had the chance to study at the Oriental 
Institute in Moscow were given intensive instruction on the problems of colonialism 
for the Peoples of the East, and even on agrarian problems too. But as a theory 
of social science, and still more as a theory of struggle, to be put to the practical 
test on many kinds o f battleground, in many different periods, each involving its 
own stage, with adversaries manifesting themselves in countless different forms, 
Marxism itself has undergone development, especially with regard to the problem[s?] 
of the peasantry. Especially in Asia, still more so in Southeast Asia, and above 
all in Indonesia. It's possible that the people who then studied at the Oriental 
Institute were still being taught that the peasants are "an auxiliary force in the 
revolution." For at that time the question o f the armed peasantry forming the back­
bone of the people's army in long-range warfare, and the vanguard in agrarian re­
form, had not yet emerged as a concrete problematic, even though Engels had al­
ready written the "Peasant War in Germany."
Their weakness in knowledge of Indonesian society was overcome by learning 
from the masses of the Indonesian people themselves. Thus, after reaching Repub­
lican territory, Drs. Setiadjid was active among the sugar mill workers, Drs.
Maruto Darusman among the plantation workers, Gondopratomo among the railway 43
students in Holland in the 1920s and 1930s. It came under increasing Communist 
influence during the 1930s.
43. Thaher Thajeb (b. 1910), of aristocratic Acehnese descent, studied in Hol­
land in the late 1930s and joined the Perhimpunan Indonesia. On his return to 
Indonesia after the war he worked with the state railways and the railway unions. 
He joined the PKI only in 1956.
44. Iwa Kusumasumantri (b. 1899), a Sundanese aristocrat and stormy petrel 
of the pergerakan, had studied in Holland in the 1920s and been chairman o f the 
PI for a time. He returned to Indonesia in 1927 and was active on the margins o f 
the PNI. Because o f his activity with labor groups in East Sumatra he was exiled 
to Banda in 1930 and only released fully on the arrival of the Japanese.
70
workers , and Zainuddin1*5 too. In general, they were successful in integrating 
themselves with the workers, and it is now a historical reality that practically all 
of them fell in the independence struggle against the Dutch, or were liquidated by 
Hatta during the MadiunAffair, or died after 1965. In short, an ex-feudalist or 
ex-bourgeois who sides with the people's struggle is far better than a "proletarian" 
who bourgeoisifies himself. Generally speaking, these leadership cadres from Hol­
land became, on arrival in Yogyakarta, the "inner circle" of Sjahrir and Amir so 
long as they were in power, and the inner circle of Amir after he split with Sjahrir. 
Accordingly, many o f them occupied positions as policy-makers for Amir Sjarifuddin.
In giving all these people names such as "local products," or "old cracks from 
Boven Digul and Australia," or "returnees from Holland," I don't mean to attribute 
a political line to each. For in practice, within the constellation of the Indonesian 
left, including the FDR, divisions on political lines were not based on such back­
grounds. Among those who came from Australia, and even among those from Hol­
land, there were some who sided with, or became, followers of Sjahrir, some who 
followed Amir, and some who followed Tan Malaka, very much in line with the gen­
eral development of political thinking at that time. For example, Djamaludin Tamin 
from Australia and Rustam Effendi from Holland,1*6 both became followers of Tan 
Malaka.
The point of setting out these groups is only to point to the historical back­
ground of each. For once the FDR was outside the government, in practice,new 
thinking emerged in each group of leadership cadres, along with introspection 
about past mistakes.
*  *  *
The ideological struggle in the Sajap Kiri, from the time of the Amir Cabinet's 
resignation to the eve of the birth o f the FDR itself, as a continuation or "een 
verbeterde editie" of the Sajap Kiri, came to be most visibly focused around two 
interrelated problems. The first was the political problem of how to continue the 
independence struggle to its conclusion. Or, how best to struggle against Dutch 
colonialism. Continuing the policy of compromise meant supporting the Hatta Gov­
ernment's policy o f negotiations. The second was that, if one didn't support this 
policy, then one ought to take the position that negotiating was wrong and express 
it clearly to the people. And this necessarily involved zelfkritik  [self-criticism], 
namely that the negotiations policy followed earlier was also wrong.
In those days there was a waning by the Gondolayu bridge, right in front of 
the FDR secretariat, a bit off to the right. I still remember the girl who served 
the food there, though none of us knew her name. All we knew was that we called 
her Ju Tien. The warung's name wasn't at all wishy-washy. On the roofing above 
the door was attached in big letters: Warung Revolusi [Revolution Warung]. Almost 456
45. Natar Zainuddin was born in West Sumatra and was active in the union o f 
railway and tramway personnel in the early 1920s. He was arrested and exiled by 
the Dutch in 1923, but allowed to return to Sumatra in the 1930s.
46. Djamaludin Tamin, a fellow Minangkabau and old close associate o f Tan Malaka, 
was interned by the Dutch in Boven Digul in the aftermath of the 1926-27 PKI re­
bellions and evacuated to Australia during the war. Rustam Effendi (b. 1903), a 
distinguished and sophisticated poet, became a member of the Lower House of the 
Dutch parliament as a member of its Communist Fraction. On his return to Indone­
sia after the war, he came to reject the "too moderate" position of Amir Sjarifuddin 
and the Socialist and PKI leaders and aligned himself with Tan Malaka.
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every day, around noon, the young people would gather there for lunch and even 
in the evenings they'd quite often take dinner at the Warung Revolusi. At Gondo- 
layu 13, the FDR secretariat occupied the front part of the premises, the headquar­
ters of the Yogyakarta Special Region Pesindo took up the middle, and at the rear 
was the headquarters of the Yogyakarta municipal branch of Pesindo, which also 
stored a 500 kg long-fuse bomb. The people from these three offices who went to 
each lunch at the Warung Revolusi were almost always the same: Wachid Amanullah, 
Sidartojo,1'7 and, from the FDR secretariat, most frequently Hasan Raid and Pardede 
Peris,1,8 who was then working there as a clerk. At that time the revolutionary 
spirit often manifested itself as the street-wolf spirit, and the proletarian spirit 
was often identical with the bohemian life style. So it was that while squatting 
there at the Warung Revolusi (because it was always we who ate there), we'd often 
gossip about everything under the sun. Among the things we gossiped about there 
were the armed clash that developed out of the football match between PSIM (Mata- 
ram Football Club) and Persidja (Jakarta Football Club), in which, nota bene [sic], 
the players consisted of boys from the Krawang Lasjkar Rakjat and former players 
from Jong Ambon Betawi1*9 who were now refugees in the Klaten area; the secret 
"Golden Chain" organization said to be a Dutch-organized spy-ring utilizing beau­
tiful girls; and the plantation workers' strike at Delanggu;90 and the Hatta Cabinet.
And we began to call this kind of gossip "Warung Revolusi gossip." "Silent 
grows the paddy" goes the proverb—and, in the same way, silently, the warung 
grew into a sort of "lobby. " Aside from hearing directly from Sudisman how wrong 
the Sjahrir policy of compromise was, I'd also often listen to Hasan Raid in the 
Warung Revolusi criticizing the policy of negotiations. Only when Sudisman talked, 
he spoke of the "Sjahrir compromise policy," while Hasan Raid attacked "the whole 
policy of negotiations" in general.
Pardede was a bit more concrete. He often used to say quite frankly that 
"Renville, with the withdrawal of troops from the pockets, was incorrect." Since 
in my experience Pardede wasn't the " eigen-denker" type [someone who thinks for 
himself], I felt pretty certain that his voice was a bamboo flute others were blow­
ing. And indeed it can no longer be denied that his words were a reflection of the 
struggle going on within the FDR itself. The general feeling was (??) that the 
climax of all the mistakes was Amir Sjarifuddin's resignation as prime minister sim­
ply because of a demonstration by a few hundred Masjumi people. In the organiza­
tional field the struggle between the two lines took on a still more complicated form. 
It manifested itself focally on the leadership role o f the Communist Party. The 478950
47. Sidartojo (b. c. 1927) became prominent as a Pesindo leader in Yogyakarta in 
the early stages of the revolution. Attached to Sudisman, he became an active 
militant of the Musso-led PKI of September 1948.
48. Peris Pardede (b. 1918) started his political life in API under Wikana in Jakar­
ta in 1945. He soon joined the PKI and helped Lukman edit Bintang Merah. Later, 
along with Aidit, Njoto,and Sudisman, he served on the FDR secretariat.
49. Jong Ambon Betawi = Ambonese Youth from Batavia/Jakarta.
50. From mid-May to mid-June 1948, the workers on the important cotton planta­
tions o f Delanggu, Central Java, went on strike against the state-controlled man­
agement. The cotton they produced was the chief source of textiles for the be­
leaguered and blockaded Republic. The Republican public quickly divided and 
polarized for or against the strikers, with the left generally in support; the bit­
terness of the strike, which involved a good deal of violence, helped prepare the 
psychological atmosphere for the "Madiun Affair."
Musso
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basic question was whether the Communist Party should step forward to lead the 
revolution or not. The "new forces" group which dominated the FDR secretariat— 
Sudisman, Aidit, and Njoto, with M. H. Lukman virtually controlling the agitprop 
[section] of the Bintaran CCPKI—believed that "the time has now come for the 
Communist Party to step directly to the fore." On the other hand, it appeared 
that this line was not yet acceptable to Tan Ling Djie, who was then officially not 
merely a member of the leadership, but actually the secretary-general,of the Social­
ist Party, with its headquarters on [J l.] Mahameru near Kridosono Square in Yog- 
yakarta. Tan ling  Djie's position, which of course had its supporters too, was 
that Indonesia was not Vietnam. If the Communist Party stepped to the fore , the 
form of the Indonesian national democratic revolution would change, i . e . , it would 
fall into the two-camp framework of the Cold War. This would only invite American 
intervention. What had to be taken into consideration, back and forth, at that 
time, was the influence of Indonesia's geographic situation. In this way, the 
difference in views manifested itself in the form of a difference in conceptions be­
tween some members of the "new forces" group and some people from the Socialist 
Party's party council. Or so it appeared on the surface. But at the same time it 
should be remembered that, aside from being secretary-general of the Socialist 
Party, Tan Ling Djie was also secretary-general of the illegal PKI, on whose Polit- 
bureau sat Amir Sjarifuddin, Abdulmadjid, and Setiadjid.
In the struggle between the old concepts and the new, the latter, aside from 
finding some support from members of the older generation who had done some 
introspection, was also reflected in the younger generation's intellectual struggle 
against old ideas. A striking example of this occurred when the younger men 
wanted to publish the Communist Manifesto. This publication was arranged to 
coincide with the centennial o f the Manifesto's original publication in 1848. There 
had been a previous translation, done even before 1926, by a man called Pratanda. 
It's my suspicion that this was a pseudonym for Darsono. Not surprisingly, this 
translation had its flaws. Not only were there many mistranslations, but its style 
was still very much the Malay style. By Malay, I mean a form of Indonesian still 
in the embryonic stage. The new translators consisted of a team led by Rollah 
Sjarifah, a sister of M. H. Lukman, assisted by Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto. When 
the translation was finished and the text ready to be published officially in the 
name of the [agitprop?] department of the Central Committee of the PKI in Bintaran 
Yogyakarta, the question arose what its title should be. At this point,in came Tan 
Ling Djie, as secretary-general of the "illegaal" CCPKI, to settle the matter. The 
argument was whether the title should be "Communist Manifesto" or "Communist 
Party Manifesto." Aidit thought that the book ought to be called "Communist Party 
Manifesto" because, organizationally speaking, it was the Communist Party's mani­
festo; indeed a Communist manifesto that did not come from the [a?] Party was 
unimaginable. Tan ling  Djie took the other view. The title had to be Communist 
Manifesto. He argued that when the text was first published the Communist Party 
had not yet been born. All there was was the Communist League.
Under normal conditions, when there was no struggle between two lines within 
the body of the FDR itself, this question would not have become so important.
Both parties had strong arguments, on organizational or historical grounds. But 
in fact, of course, the dispute took place in the shadow of the struggle between 
the two lines. Historically speaking, Tan Ling Djie was right—the original name 
of the manifesto was The Communist Manifesto. Nonetheless, later developments 51
51. Darsono, vice-president of the PKI at the time of its formation in 1920. At 
that time he was the party's leading intellectual. He later left the party.
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also showed that after Marx's death, and even while Engels was still alive, the text 
was published in Spanish under the title "Manifesto del Partido Komunista [s ic ]."
Yet the difference of opinion on this matter was only a surface symptom. The 
group that called itself the "new forces," originally inspired by the writings of 
Sharkey, already clearly sensed there was something not straight [deviating?] 
going on, but was still unable to formulate its feelings completely in theoretical 
terms. But from my conversations with the young men at the FDR secretariat at 
that time, I can say today that the "new forces"—i . e . , Sudisman, then the most 
senior, plus Lukman, Aidit,and Njoto—were disillusioned with the Renville Agree­
ment , the withdrawal of troops from the enclaves ( then referred to as "pocket 
areas"), and, to crown it all, the resignation of the Amir Cabinet, which they re­
garded as a false step.
At that time the otoriteit [authority] of Amir Sjarifuddin was still so great that 
they did not lay the blame on Bung Amir, but rather on his policy-maker[s]: i . e . , 
Amir's inner circle from the Socialist Party's party council, most of whose members 
were also members of the illegal CCPKI's Politbureau led by Tan Ling Djie.
So it was that a simple matter, like a difference in opinion at the FDR offices 
in Gondolayu 13 on whether to title a book "The Communist Manifesto" or "The 
Communist Party Manifesto," was finally settled by Aidit with a severe intervention 
against Tan ling  Djie.* And behind what appeared to be simply a struggle over 
a name lay hidden the concept of the '"new forces' group" to stress the otoriteit 
of the PKI, which, as they put it, had been "stuffed under the table" hitherto.
Looking only at the surface manifestations of the difference of views will not,
I believe, bring us to an understanding of the real essence of the matter. In 
essence, all of this was also a contradiction within the PKI itself, between the legal 
and the illegal party. It so happened that the people involved were PKI activists 
in the FDR and members of the Pesindo Central Council in Yogyakarta. The strug­
gle between the two lines also emerged in the ideological field in the form of a 
"theoretical" polemic between the magazine Bintang Merah, run by M. H. Lukman, 
and Suara Ibu Kota under Wikana, but in which the active role was taken by Jusuf 
Muda Dalam who had come back into Republican territory from Holland as a reporter 
for the Daily Worker. Here again the problem was basically quite simple. Wikana 
had published a brochure called Marxism Made Easy. His idea was to enlighten the 
people, i.e . , to give guidance to the people, whose level of consciousness was then 
not very high. They could not be expected to understand the meaning of "das 
kapital" or "surplus value" or "the historical philosophy of materialism [s ic ]."  So 
they needed to be given some guidance, to make it easier for them to understand 
the essence of Marxism. This little booklet was, it turned out, strongly attacked 
by M. H. Lukman, who took as his point of departure the idea that Marxism is a 
science, and cannot be studied in a facile way, etc.
* It turned out that this affair had long term consequences. After Aidit came to 
head the PKI's Politbureau, Tan Ling Djie was kicked out of it, and Aidit published 
a "theoretical" text on "Tan Ling Djie-ism." One o f the political conclusions in this 
text was "T.L.D.-ism is an ism,prevalent among Indonesian revolutionaries,that 
wants to change society by legal means." But wasn't this exactly what Aidit did 
so effectively during the period he led the Party? In 1962, Tan Ling Djie once 
dropped by my house at Jl. Cilosari 31, Jakarta, and complained that he'd never 
been given the opportunity to defend himself or express his views on this thesis.
It should be noted that, after Suharto came to power, Tan lin g  Djie was liquidated 
in the Kalisosok prison in Surabaya.
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The struggle between the two lines in the FDR, or, more precisely, within the 
PKI, inevitably reverberated in the Pesindo Central Council in Surakarta. Inevita­
bly , because it is no exaggeration to say that, in terms both of personnel and 
politics, Pesindo was the backbone of the FDR. The reason for this was not sim­
ply that, as a young organization, Pesindo was a bit better when compared with 
other youth organizations (or with the other organizations within the FDR), but 
it also had a military organization which, while not as strong as the TNI [Army], 
still can be said to have been the strongest among all the various lasjkars. In 
practically every important kabupaten [regency] in Central and East Java, and 
also in some places in West Java, there were armed Pesindo units.
Among these units, the strongest was the "Surabaya Division," with an arms- 
troop ratio of 1 to 4, i . e . , with a real fighting strength of one regiment, under 
the leadership of Sidik Arselan.52 After the rationalization and reconstruction of 
the Armed Forces under Hatta,53 54this regiment became Brigade 29 under Ov. 
Mohamad Dahlan. Before crystallization took place in the Socialist Party,51* the 
terms "kite" [we]55 and "mereka" [they] were already current in the FDR. "Kite" 
meant Amir's people, while "they" were the followers of Sjahrir who virtually con­
trolled the Pesindo central headquarters in Malang. After the split in the Social­
ist Party and the birth of the Indonesian Socialist Party, the Central Defense Head­
quarters located on Jl. Glintung in Malang was "daulated"56 by Rudito, a pemuda 
who earlier had freed Amir Sjarifuddin from the Lowokwaru jail in Malang.57 (At 
the time of the Proclamation, Amir Sjarifuddin had been appointed the first minis­
ter of information, but no one yet knew where he had been "stashed" by the
52. Lt. Col. Sidik Arselan was a Pesindo regimental commander in what became 
Brigade 29. He was arrested after the Madiun uprising and shot on October 11, 
1948.
53. In the so-called Presidential Cabinet that succeeded Amir Sjarifuddin's on 
January 29, 1948, Vice-President Hatta assumed the functions of both prime minis­
ter and defense minister. Among the cabinet’s programs was a plan (partially 
taken over from Amir's cabinet) to "rationalize" the Republican armed forces, 
which had swollen to an enormous size, beyond the government’ s capacity to pay, 
arm, or feed them. The plan involved the amalgamation of many units, and the 
discharge of all superfluous personnel back into civilian life. Needless to say, it 
was very unpopular.
54. On February 13, 1948 Sjahrir and his followers broke off from the Socialist 
Party to form the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia—Socialist Party of Indonesia). 
Conflict between the "left" (Amir) and "right" (Sjahrir) wings of the Socialist 
Party had always existed, and it had worsened particularly in 1947, when many 
Sjahrir supporters believed Amir had exploited Sjahrir’ s diplomatic difficulties to 
replace him as prime minister.
55. Kite—Jakarta slang for kita (the "inclusive" we).
56. To "daulat" someone was a typical coined phrase of the revolutionary years. 
Daulat/kedaulatan means "sovereignty": to daulat someone meant to arrest, kidnap, 
or kill a suspected spy , feudalist, or counterrevolutionary in the name of the sover­
eignty o f the people.
57. Amir Sjarifuddin had been imprisoned in Malang by the Japanese in 1944, on 
suspicion o f being involved in a Communist underground. He had been saved from 
execution only by the personal intervention of Sukarno and Hatta with the Japa­
nese authorities. He was not freed from the Malang jail until well after the Proc­
lamation o f Independence.
Djokosujono
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Japanese.) In this way the terminology "kite" and "mereka" fell out of use in the 
Pesindo Central Council. This did not mean that the struggle between different 
viewpoints ended, however. Particularly in Yogyakarta, it should be noted, 
Pesindo, as the backbone of the FDR, had a certain prestige. Especially in lasjkar 
circles, in the wake of the unsuccessful Tan Malaka coup d'etat of July 3, 1946.
As is well known, this coup was launched by the division commanded by Sudarsono, 
whose territory was Yogyakarta. And at that time Suharto, who was commander of 
the Yogyakarta Regiment, was ordered by Bung Karno to arrest Sudarsono, but 
failed to do s o .58 Thus the position of the Republic's central government was like 
an egg on the tip o f a buffalo's horn. To overcome this crisis, East Java Pesindo 
units were rushed in , and security and protection for the [ Presidential] palace 
were assigned to the Pesindo Maluku,59 led by Major Ririhena. Nonetheless, this 
element of prestige did not make Pesindo immune from the struggle between the 
two lines within the FDR, which in essence was a struggle between two lines within 
the PKI itself.
The reason for this, naturally, was not "Warung Revolusi gossip" alone, but 
mainly that within Pesindo itself there was a means of entry, since many top-level 
FDR figures were also Pesindo functionaries. Wikana was both an FDR leader and 
second deputy chairman of Pesindo's Central Council. Sudisman was chairman of 
Pesindo's Planning Council, which in practice was the organization's "policy- 
planner," and Aidit was a member of Pesindo's Plenary Central Council. Wikana 
and Sudisman were also members of the illegal PKI's Politbureau, while Aidit was a 
representative of the Bintaran PKI's Central Committee in the FDR's secretariat.
Within the ambience of the Pesindo Central Council Wikana made an attempt to 
overcome the differences in views prevailing in the FDR, by theses presented to 
the Central Council's plenary meeting in November 1947. These theses were 
entitled "Preventing the bankruptcy o f revolutionary-ism," but they were also 
known as the "November theses." Their aim was to combat both rightwing and 
leftwing opportunism. The plenum decided to "go back to the masses," and that 
Pesindo would not be the onderbouw [sic] of the PKI, but rather a sort of educa­
tional institution guided by the teachings o f Marxism-Leninism, while acknowledg­
ing the leading role of the PKI in the struggle against the Dutch. A green light 
for highlighting the leadership role of the PKI. This decision was evidently an 
attempt to build bridges. On the one hand, it decided that [Pesindo was] not an 
"onderbouw o f the PKI"—because it was felt that, if Pesindo became such an 
onderbouw, many of its members, especially people in its Plenary Central Council, 
would split. On the other hand, it "acknowledged the leading role of the PKI in 
the revolution."
Even though these new ideas were developing, then, they still did not repre­
sent a dominant line. Yet within certain limits, the struggle between the two lines 
was reflected in February 1948 in the process that then gave birth to the FDR's 
struggle program, namely: 1. Break off negotiations with the Dutch. 2. Agrarian
58. The reference is to General Sudarsono, commander o f the Third Division in 
the spring o f 1946. The Suharto referred to here is the current President of 
Indonesia. At the time he was a middle-level officer, strategically placed on the 
outskirts of Yogyakarta. President Sukarno and the Amir-Sjahrir government 
found themselves helpless against Sudarsono in view o f the attitude o f the local 
armed forces to the ongoing negotiations with the Dutch. They had to be rescued 
by the summoning of Pesindo troops loyal to Amir from East Java.
59. Pesindo Maluku—a special section of Pesindo filled with Ambonese/Moluccan 
youths.
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reform as an endeavor to attract the peasants by abolishing the remnants of feu­
dalism. But in the field of organization, especially with regard to the leadership 
role of the PKI, there was evidently no resolution as yet. Whether or not the 
"green light" would mean moving ahead, now depended basically on subjective fac­
tors within the PKI itself. And so long as the fundamental problems of the anti­
colonial revolution against the Dutch were not yet klaar [solved], even though the 
green light had been given, this leadership role would not in fact be manifested— 
until Musso's arrival.
*  *  *
In such a situation, where this central problem remained unresolved and yet 
smoldered away inside, at the beginning o f August 1948 Musso returned to Indone­
sia, after an absence o f 13 years, and for the umpteenth time eluding the Dutch 
colonial government's secret police. From what I heard in Indonesia about Musso's 
return route, it appeared that he'd come by plane from Prague, via Cairo and Ran­
goon. After stopping over in Bukittinggi, he finally landed on the swamp of 
Campur Darat, a district in South Tulungagung. He arrived back in Indonesia 
along with Suripno.60 There was no airfield in that area, just a huge swamp. The 
only correct conclusion is that he came in from Bukittinggi on a Catalina amphibi­
ous plane. His landing did not particularly attract the attention of the local inhab­
itants, for ever since the end of Dutch colonial rule, i . e . , during the Pacific War, 
the Dutch had used the swamp as an amphibian airbase. And during the Japanese 
occupation, the same swamp was often used by planes bringing in high Japanese 
officials to inspect the Nee-Yama Project. (This Nee-Yama Project, formerly known 
as the Tumpak Oyod Project—involved the construction o f a tunnel under the moun­
tains to drain the swamp into Popoh Bay in order to prevent floods in Tulung­
agung.) At that time Suripno's official position abroad was representative o f Indo­
nesian students at the IUS (International Union o f Students) which was headquar­
tered in Prague. In addition, he also had a mandate from Prime Minister Amir 
Sjarifuddin to act as ambassador plenipotentiary to seek recognition for the Repub­
lic o f Indonesia. Before returning to Indonesia, he had succeeded in signing a 
protocol of full diplomatic recognition o f the Republic of Indonesia by the Soviet 
Union. This act o f recognition was signed in Prague by Silin, the Soviet Union's 
ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
Officially this was a "Suripno-Musso" party, not a "Musso-Suripno" party, for 
officially Suripno was returning to Indonesia as ambassador plenipotentiary, where­
as Musso's status was that of his secretary.
In the book "Lives given to Freedom—Dedications to communist fighters'' pub­
lished by the "Nauka Publishing House, Department of Oriental Literature, Mos­
cow ," 1966, ''Indonesia" section, there are on page 221 biographies of Musso and 
Amir Sjarifuddin, while on page 229 there is a picture of Musso and Suripno
60. Suripno was a brilliant young Communist protege of Amir Sjarifuddin, who had 
been sent to Prague in 1947 to act as ambassador plenipotentiary to the East Euro­
pean states, with the idea of securing recognition of the Republic from them. On 
May 22, 1948,rather out of the blue, he concluded a consular treaty with the Rus­
sian ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Although he was carrying out his mission in 
good faith, his success deeply embarrassed the Hatta government which was try­
ing to gain American favor, and Suripno was disavowed and recalled. (He had 
been a member o f the PI and the anti-Nazi underground in Holland, like Setiadjid, 
Abdulmadjid, and Jusuf Muda Dalam.)
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relaxing on the grass beside a river. From this picture one gets the impression 
that before their departure the two men had met or known each other in Moscow.
From Campur Darat Musso headed for Yogyakarta, stopping off on the way in 
Solo, but not in Madiun. At that time, even though Madiun was headquarters for 
the Working Body of the Youth Congress, led by Sumarsono,61 it was nonetheless 
not yet a "center of political developments." And the contradictions between 
armed units, lasjkar against lasjkar, and lasjkar against the Army, were not as 
sharp as they were in Surakarta (Solo) or Yogyakarta. It seems that in Solo 
Musso received information which was a bit "overestimate": in particular about 
the strength of the progressive armed forces, consisting of the Su'adi Brigade, 
the Sujoto Brigade, 2 and the Navy Brigade under Ahmad Jadau.63 64 For aside 
from these, there were also the Barisan Pemberontakan led by Anwar and Mar- 
djuki,61* and the Barisan Banteng under Dr. Muwardi.65 The antagonisms between 
the people and the feudal system in Surakarta were manifested in the question of 
swapraja [sunanate autonomy] ,66 the plantation workers' strike in Delanggu, etc. 
All of them, within certain limits, found their expression in conflicts between the 
political parties and also among the armed forces. This situation became all the 
more complex and heated with the arrival o f the Siliwangi hijrah troops,67 who
61. Sumarsono was also a leading figure in Pesindo.
62. Su'adi and Sujoto were both brigade commanders, believed to have leftwing 
sympathies, in the Solo area at the time, within the Senapati Division.
63. In this period the Indonesian Navy functioned much more as a land-based in­
fantry force than as a naval presence on seas completely dominated by the Dutch. 
The real name of Jadau, who headed these forces, was A. W. Sardjono (b. 1923). 
He was the son of a well-known pejuang in the pergerakan. He was arrested 
after the 1965 coup.
64. The Barisan Pemberontakan was an important, if rather erratic, nationalist 
paramilitary force under the loose general control of the famous Bung Tomo.
Anwar and Madjuki were its local leaders in Solo, both widely reputed to be en­
gaged in corruption and extortion, to the point that some of their units were 
forcibly disarmed by the government in the spring of 1948.
65. The Barisan Banteng (Wild Buffalo Corps) was an ultra-nationalist paramili­
tary organization led by the hot-tempered Dr. Muwardi, a close associate of 
Sukarno, and, to a much lesser extent, o f Tan Malaka. The Barisan Banteng be­
came an important component in 1948 of the Gerakan Revolusioner Rakjat (People's 
Revolutionary Movement), inspired by Tan Malaka, hostile both to the FDR and 
the government on the grounds of their alleged opportunism and weakness in face 
of the Dutch.
66. The swapradja issue was a long-standing conflict over the status of the for­
mer feudal principalities of Central Java, especially the two in Solo. Swapradja = 
self-rule.
67. By the terms of the Renville Agreement Siliwangi troops from West Java under 
the command of Col. Sadikin had had to evacuate their base areas in West Java 
and move into the new shrunken boundaries of the Republic, in Central Java.
The term hijrah, an Arabic word referring to the Prophet's flight from Mecca to 
Medina, was used in 1947-48 to describe the enforced "flight" of Siliwangi and 
other troops from enemy controlled territory. Just as Muhammad eventually re­
turned in triumph to Mecca, so it was hoped that the Republican troops would 
eventually triumphantly reenter their former region.
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immediately altered the balance of power between the progressives and the reac­
tionaries in Surakarta. The manifestation of this which most obviously became a 
public controversy was the antagonism between units led by officers of the Panem- 
bahan Senapati [Division], most of whom had been activists of the pergerakan, 
and then received military training in Peta during the Japanese period, and those 
led by [Siliwangi] officers who had been trained in the KNIL [Koninklijke Neder- 
landsch Indische Leger—Royal Netherlands Indies Army] in the Dutch Indies 
period. Naturally, these were only surface symptoms. The deeper conflict was 
a long-standing and unresolved social antagonism, dating back long before the 
arrival o f the Siliwangi hijrah troops. The presence of the Siliwangi with its 
"Hollands sprekende officieren" [Dutch-speaking officers] simply sharpened the 
existing antagonism. With a perceptio [perspective?] of this sort Musso left Solo 
for Yogyakarta.
Musso's first public statement was his open letter to the newspapers in the 
capital. The two papers which published it in full were, as I recall it, Suara Ibu 
Kota, edited by Wikana and Jusuf Muda Dalam, and Revolusioner, run by Soe- 
peno.68 The only real point of this letter was the formation of a "National Front." 
Its title was "Proposal for the Formation of a National Front." The gist of it was 
that the various political parties should draw up a common " p la t fo r m and create 
a practical foreign and domestic program which the people could feel as relevant. 
The sole aim of this proposal for the formation of a National Front was to mobilize 
every potential to fight Dutch colonialism. What struck everyone in Republican 
territory then as new was the conception of an organized National Front. Member­
ship was to be open both to political parties opposed to Dutch colonialism, and to 
individuals. The basic idea was to solve the big problem of how to involve the 
very large numbers of people in society who were not members of political parties 
but whose thinking was opposed to Dutch colonialism. This then was the National 
Front, a conception or idea which, it seemed, Musso had thought over carefully 
while still abroad, with the aim of making it a unifying mechanism for mobilizing 
the masses to fight Dutch colonialism. But beside this there was the realiteit of 
a variety of political parties whose existence could not be ignored. Immediately 
after Musso arrived, he met Bung Karno. This was their first and last meeting. 
After leaving the palace, Musso was taken off by Suripno to visit the editorial 
offices of the weekly Revolusioner in Jl. Loji Kecil Wetan 14, in the Gondamanan 
district. There Musso explained, inter alia, that in his meeting [with Bung Karno] 
the main topic of their discussions had been how to organize the people to confront 
Dutch colonialism. The question of whether or not to negotiate with the Dutch had 
not been raised; but, as Musso was on the point of leaving the palace, Bung Karno 
had given him this message: "I hope, Pak Musso, now that you're back in the 
motherland, you can help create rust en orde." "Don't worry, ik kom hier terug 
om orde te scheppen [I've come here precisely to establish order]." After that 
the two men never met again.
While staying in Yogya, Musso held meetings or briefing with various organi­
zations in a very intensive way; in addition, he once gave a lecture to the stu­
dents of Gajah Mada University. And before leaving Yogyakarta with Amir Sjari- 
fuddin, Setiadjid and Maruto Darusman, for a tour of the provinces to make 
propaganda for a united front to fight the Dutch, Musso also on one occasion ad­
dressed a mass rally in the alun2 utara [northern alun2] of Yogyakarta.69 During
68. Soepeno (b. 1916) had been a youthful nationalist militant in the late 1930s 
and became a top leader of Pesindo in 1946-48, during which period he edited the 
magazine Revolusioner in Yogyakarta.
69. Alun2—the traditional large square in the center o f Javanese towns of any
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his lecture at Gajah Mada, there was a student who asked a question in what 
Musso may have felt was a rather "skeptical" tone. The student asked, "In the 
present situation are we capable of resisting the Dutch?"
Musso rolled up his sleeves and answered: "Why not? Here is Musso, my 
friend, who once joined the International Brigade to fight against fascism in 
Madrid. . . . "
The sugar mill workers in Tasikmadu or Padokan, or the plantation workers 
in Delanggu, or the peasants in Kediri might have greeted Musso's answer with 
applause. And indeed some of the students at the meeting that night did clap, 
but there were also some who regarded Musso's answer as un-"acceptab/e" be­
cause it was not scientific.
At the mass rally in the northern alun2 in Yogyakarta, one part of Musso's 
speech answered the "general" question of the balance of military power between 
the Republic and the Dutch. He said: "Who says we are militarily weak? There 
are plenty of weapons, over there in the hands of the Dutch colonial army, plenty 
of them! They're the ones we must seize." This speech was actually a double- 
bladed knife. In a general sense, it was an explanation to the people, teaching 
them to have the courage to resist the Dutch and abandon the policy of negotia­
tions. But, more specifically, it was also clearly an answer to elements who were 
dubious about his concept, of whom there were particularly large numbers in the 
Labor Party led by Setiadjid. This needs some explanation. Before Musso left 
Yogyakarta with the FDR group, much of his time was taken up by meetings with 
the leaderships o f the FDR's component parties and with individuals. The main 
reasons for this were that conditions in the FDR were ripe, and it was also essen­
tial to unite the members of the FDR first before proceeding to unite the people. 
Crystallization in the Socialist Party had already taken place with the formation 
of the PSI headed by Sjahrir. So there was no real problem there any more. At 
one meeting in the presence o f the workers at the SOB SI Central Bureau's offices, 
which lay close by the Tugu [railway] station, Bung Amir said: "The prime re­
sponsibility for the mistaken policy that has been pursued by the FDR lies with 
me. If the People demand that someone be put on trial, the first one to be hanged 
by the People should be me."
But things didn't go nearly so smoothly when Musso put forward his concept 
to the Labor Party. In every briefing Musso gave, including the one to the Labor 
Party, he always pointed to the same conclusion—the need for organizational and 
political preparation. The most important organizational preparation was the 
holding of a fusion congress. Political preparation included the preparation of 
public opinion for resisting the Dutch. With regard to the latter, there were no 
real problems. But this was not the case with organizational preparations.
It was evident that the internal condition of the Labor Party was rather com­
plicated. One group, whose spokesmen were Asrarudin70 and S. K. Trimurti, 
turned out to be highly recalcitrant to accepting Musso's concept. Resisting the 
Dutch was no problem. But fusion under the leadership of the PKI was another 
story. At a meeting held in SOBSI's Central Bureau at Tugu, S. K. Trimurti put
size. The old royal capitals of Yogyakarta and Solo each had two, one to the 
north and one to the south of the royal palaces.
70. Asrarudin (b. 1907) had been a labor organizer and nationalist cadre in the 
late 1920s and 1930s. In the revolution, he continued in both roles, as a politi­
cian in the Indonesian Labor Party and (from 1947 to 1949) as deputy chairman of 
SOBSI's leadership in Yogyakarta.
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forward the following question: "Given that the PKI has made a lot of political 
mistakes in this struggle against the Dutch, can it really be given the leading role, 
can it really win the confidence of the people?" He [Musso] answered, pointing 
to S. K. Trimurti: "Naaah, that . . . that’ s a Trotskyist question. . . . "  Ac­
tually it was a simple question, based on facts, which really could have been 
answered patiently by: "Yes, indeed, the PKI has made mistakes, and these mis­
takes have been pretty fundamental. But still the PKI has carried out self- 
criticism, meaning, it has voluntarily criticized itself. Whereas up till now not a 
single other party has had the courage to admit its mistakes before the people.
On the question of whether [the Party] is capable or not o f providing leadership, 
and winning the confidence of the people, the answer mainly depends, once a 
correct political line has been laid down, on the struggle of the Party’ s cadres to 
win over the people. A correct political line doesn't automatically win the people's 
confidence, for this depends very much on the human beings who promote this 
political line." In this context "human beings" means "cadres."
Unfortunately, Musso didn't have the patience to answer this way. By bring­
ing the issue of "Trotskyism" into the country, Musso, who in forming the "Na­
tional Front" intended to create the broadest possible basis for mobilizing the 
people to fight against Dutch colonialism, actually lost the chance to attract revo­
lutionary forces with potential (??) from the Murba Party71 and the Angkatan 
Komunis Muda [Young Communist Generation] (abbreviated as Akoma, and with 
Ibnu Parna as its main figure). When Aidit set to work on these lines after 1950, 
many members o f the Murba Party and Akoma, who had earlier been branded as 
Trotskyites simply because they rejected the Iinggadjati and Renville agreements, 
became actual leaders in the PKI. Such were: Legiman Haryana (a member of 
Murba's Political Council), who after the Dutch aggression changed his name to 
Ismail Bakri, and later became a member of the PKI Central Committee and its top 
figure in West Java; Sidik Kertapati,72 a leader of Akoma, who together with 
Chaerul Saleh and Armunanto was active in the West Java Lasjkar Rakjat, which 
was part of the opposition to Iinggadjati and rejected the whole policy of negotiat­
ing with the Dutch whether this policy was pursued by Sjahrir, Amir, or Hatta, 
and who later became a member of the PKI's Central Committee. In addition there 
was also Juliarso, foreign editor of Harian Rakjat.73
In effect, Musso would have been better able to attract people in Murba and 
Akoma, which were federated within the GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat—People's 
Revolution Movement) , if  the question of Trotskyism and the question of Tan 
Malaka had not been made an issue. The reason was that Trotskyism was not a 
central problem in the revolution at that time. For, aside from the fact that the 
number [of Trotskyists] was very small, the main enemy of the revolution was 
Dutch colonialism. Like Trotskyism, the problem of Tan Malaka was also a legacy 
of an earlier historical period. Besides, Tan Malaka himself was then in prison, 
in connection with the failure of the July 3, 1946 coup d'etat.
71. The Murba (Proletarian) party was formed in November 1948, by a fusion of 
various small pro-Tan Malaka organizations hitherto federated within the GRR.
(In some respects this fusion corresponded to the fusion of component FDR organ­
izations into the new PKI.)
72. Sidik Kertapati (b. 1919) was a well-known writer and intellectual who had 
participated successively in Gerindo, the API of Jakarta under Wikana, and the 
West Java People's Militia under Chaerul Saleh.
73. The official PKI newspaper in the 1950s and early 1960s.
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Before the FDR group led by Musso started on its tour to Purwodadi, Madiun, 
and Bojonegoro to make propaganda for the formation of the National Front to re­
sist Dutch imperialism, it stopped off briefly in Solo. There Musso attended a 
plenary meeting of Pesindo's Central Council, quartered in the building that once 
housed the Habipraya Society. In this plenary meeting, Musso gave his short 
address. At the start of this speech he did not give the usual Pesindo gesture 
of greeting at that time—the shout "Merdeka!" with the five fingers of the left 
hand clenched into a fist—but rather clenched his right hand and shouted:
"Menang Perang!" ["V ictory!"]. He explained his confidence that we would be 
victorious in the fight against Dutch colonialism by saying that conditions now 
were much more favorable to us than in 1926. He then went on to propose the 
following functions for Pesindo after the projected FDR fusion congress, func­
tions which indeed were later reflected in the decisions taken at that meeting:
1. Pesindo would remain a mass organization of the Pemuda, and organizationally 
would not be the onderbouw of any party. 2. Its function would be to serve as 
a place for preparing and training revolutionary cadres with a Marxist-Leninist 
education.
Subsequently, in mass rallies at Madiun, before he headed off for Bojonegoro 
and Purwodadi, Musso stated for the first time that: "The PKI does not feel bound 
by either the Linggadjati or Renville agreements." So it was that, after Musso 
reached the Purwodadi region, the Madiun Affair occurred. We will not discuss 
here how, before the revolt, fighting broke out in Solo, how Slamet Rijadi71* came 
to the Pemuda Congress headquarters in Madiun to find Sumarsono and ask for 
military support, how Defense Minister Hatta wired the KRU (Kesatuan Reserve 
Umum [General Reserve Units] under Dr. Mustopo)74 5 to disarm all Pesindo units, 
and so forth.
As I once wrote to Bung Ben before, when the Solo affair (also known as the 
Srambatan affair) erupted, which ended with the murder of Major Sutarno, Bung 
Amir, as head of the Defense Section of the FDR (read Military Commission under 
the Central Committee), in a letter to Sakirman as his representative/deputy 
urged him repeatedly to make sure that the Solo affair was localized. This letter 
was received by Sakirman while he was at a meeting of the FDR secretariat behind 
the editorial offices of Suara Ibu Kota in Gondolayu.
Daily life went on as usual in Yogyakarta, quite calm. Up until the evening 
of September 19, 1948, when Bung Karno made his radio speech calling on the 
people to choose "Musso" or "Sukarno-Hatta." That morning, before the Working 
Committee of the KNIP, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hatta had asked for 
extraordinary powers to crush the Madiun rebellion, since, as stated in his offi­
cial speech that day, "according to reports, which may or may not be true, a 
Soviet Government has been set up in Madiun with Musso as its President."
From that moment a communistophobic hysteria was whipped up , on the pretext 
of what was termed "the Communist rebellion" or "the savagery of the Communists."
74. Slamet Rijadi was a charismatic young Catholic commander in the Senopati 
Division which controlled the Solo area. He came to ask for this help because 
fighting had broken out between Senopati men and Siliwangi hijrah troops sta­
tioned in that city under the Renville Agreement; in this fighting, which in­
volved also kidnappings and murders, Senopati got the worst of it.
75. The General Reserve Units, brainchild of Army Chief of Staff Nasution, were 
intended as a crack strike force directly under central government command. Dr. 
Mustopo, a brave but eccentric ex-Peta commander, was a Sukarno-Hatta loyalist.
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But from that day to this, it has always been the same story, not a single person 
has ever brought before a court convincing proofs of how the rebellion was 
planned. So it was that in Madiun the only methods of proof were those of 
"snelrecht" [summary justice] as practiced at that time. In other words, military 
field courts which require little in the way of evidentiary procedures.
For this reason, I am not surprised when I hear that now in Jakarta there are 
many people writing again about the "Madiun rebellion," according to their sepa­
rate versions—with the Communists, who have been imprisoned for thirteen years 
without any proof of their guilt, as the scapegoats. This is only too likely, for 
in every period of history, every social group will certainly worship its own heroes 
on the stage of its own history.
Of course, it is not my intention here to write about the Madiun Affair. But 
on this affair, during the period when I was on the run, I wrote a little book called 
"The Solo and Madiun Affairs" under the pseudonym of Jusuf Bakri. I prepared 
this manuscript while Njoto and I were in Magelang, in 1948-49. Later, after the 
Round Table Conference, it was issued as a brochure, nicely printed in Medan.
In Magelang, it was stencilled and then, via Yogyakarta, distributed to Jakarta 
and the regions of Central and East Java. To those without prejudices the Madiun 
Affair only really became clear ten years later. In court Aidit made his accusation 
in a work entitled "A Confrontation of the PRRI Affair with the Madiun Affair."
It was later published as a white book.
All these books were published in a situation where the mass media in the 
larger cities of Indonesia could not be said to be "dominated," let alone "con­
trolled," by the Communists. Nonetheless, not a single newspaper or magazine 
offered a serious rebuttal of the factual explanations provided about all the de­
tails of the Madiun Affair. And now, when the Communist press has been closed 
down, their [the Communists'] printeries confiscated, and more than 100,000 of 
them thrown into jail or put into various concentration camps, i . e . , when they 
have not even the most elementary means to defend themselves, many people are 
writing again about questions that are already clear.
If one speaks of the affair itself, the Communists were above all the victims, 
not those who claimed victims. For this reason, to speak about this national 
tragedy is deeply saddening. But some day, when there is a forum which pro­
vides an outlet for the Communists, I am ready to provide what explanations I 
can. Though actually there is no need for further repetition, for things are al­
ready quite clear, in the sense that both sides have already given their respective 
views. The highest court is history itself, and the generations that are still to 
come. We still have much time ahead.
All during the revolution, and even till today, even though I have no news­
paper to work for, I have always tried to be nothing other than a reporter. For 
that reason I have always avoided involving myself with the executives or organi­
zations or of the Party. For me, being a professional reporter is enough. Not too 
high and not too low. If I were involved in the executive organs of mass organiza­
tions , or of the Party, it would, in my view, too easily put me in the position of 
losing "check and balance." So, as a reporter, from the moment that Musso ar­
rived to the time he left Yogyakarta, I took a lot of trouble to keep my ears open. 
So, too, after the Madiun Affair, I always asked myself: "Did Musso really bring 
with him a plan to set up a Soviet in Madiun with himself as president?" The 
answer—after I listened to various people I talked with before the affair occurred 
—was "impossible."
Even the speech of Bung Hatta as prime minister and minister of defense at 
that time still included as an "escape clausule" the words, "which may or may not
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be true." And, in addition, according to even the most elementary Marxist dic­
tionary , in the stage of the national democratic revolution against colonialism, the 
task that has to be carried out is , as Bung Kamo often put it, the "samenbunde- 
ling van alle revolutionaire krachten."  Furthermore, at the 1946 Pesindo Congress 
in Malang, Bung Kamo said to us: "In the struggle for the samenbundeling van 
alle revolutionaire krachten, the criterion is : whoever is antiimperialist o r , put 
concretely, against Dutch colonialism, is a revolutionary. Clement Attlee says he 
is from the Labour Party, Ernest Bevin says he is from the Labour Party and 
agrees with Marxism, but he also agrees to colonialism's war in Indonesia, and 
oppresses the Malayan independence movement. Therefore he is a reactionary.
In the same way, Koos Vorrink is the head of the Partai van der Arbeid76 and 
claims to be a Marxist, but since he accepts the colonial war in Indonesia, he is 
a reactionary. On the other hand, Emir Amanullah of Afghanistan was a monarch, 
a feudalist, but he was antiimperialist, and so he was a revolutionary." This 
viewpoint is one which is generally accepted among progressives. And by the 
dictionary of Marxism this is very elementary.
But why then did Musso return as "or right man in a wrong time"? For, to 
this day, I still think that Musso would have more easily corrected the errors of 
the FDR if he had returned when Amir Sjarifuddin was still in power. Did he re­
turn simply to meet old resistance comrades, or to see his family, or because he 
was homesick for his country? I think such a conclusion is too simple. For 
letterlijk Musso only once, and for a very brief time, met his mbakyu [wife] from 
Pagu (Pare-Kediri) and only once met his son Margono from Magetan. All of this 
took place in the Party offices at Jl. Bintaran Wetan, Yogyakarta. After the 
meeting, Pirngadi, a member of Bintang Merah's editorial staff, told me about it.
He said that, at the end of the meeting, Musso gave his watch to his son as a sou­
venir and said to him: "Here's a keepsake from me. When you go home, you must 
have the courage to fight for the revolution." In these matters, Musso was a 
puritan. And this was the first and last meeting with his son. Similarly, in 
briefings with the leaders of the various FDR member organizations, Musso mostly 
talked about political and organizational preparations for the formation of a single 
working class Party and the formation of the National Front. In discussions with 
various military commanders, Musso focused most of his attention on the struggle 
against the Dutch. All this was, I think, a correct reflection of Musso's concept 
at that time.
In briefings with various cadres who commanded armed units, Musso's orien­
tation was a bit more concrete. Let me offer a more or less typical example. One 
of those briefed was Sudradjad. In the period o f the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet 
he'd been a Major-General,since he ran the munitions section [of the defense min­
istry]. When Amir resigned, Sudradjad left Republican territory and organized 
units in the occupied zone. Another person there was Soepeno, former chief of 
the Pemuda Inspectorate in the Central Resistance Bureau, who still commanded a 
number of armed units as dekking [protection] for the weekly Revolusioner in 
Yogyakarta (which later became a daily).
The last person who spoke to me rather openly was the head of the Barisan 
Pemberontakan Rakjat Indonesia (BPRI [Insurrectionary League of the Indonesian 
People]) for the residency of Kediri. His name was Nata'. He spoke frankly with 
me because both of us were from Blitar, and in the Japanese time we were arrested 
and imprisoned together by the Japanese. After meeting with Musso, he came and 
told me: "The main thing is we have to have the courage to fight behind enemy
76. Partij van der Arbeid—The Dutch Labor Party—was a central element in all 
postwar Dutch cabinets and so bore major responsibility for their colonial policies.
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lines. Right now, we shouldn't have too many speeches." "Meaning what?" I 
asked. "Pak Musso's idea is that we should move our units and be active in enemy- 
occupied zones. Now that they're empty, whoever is the most active there, who- 
ever's bravest in fighting the Dutch, he'll be the one to be recognized by the peo­
ple." So Nata' told me. He was rather older than I. In the Dutch colonial time 
he'd been an electrical worker. His hair had turned a bit gray just in front. So 
the gray part looked a bit like a cock's comb [jambul]. When we talked about him 
we used to use his nom de guerre, Si Jambul. I never thought then that this 
meeting would be our last. He survived the Madiun Affair. During the second 
military action he reassembled his troops in south Blitar. He had one battalion 
under him, known as the Brantas battalion. After the Round Table Agreement, 
on the orders of regimental commander Surachmad, this Brantas battalion was, 
without any justification, suddenly disarmed by the "Sikatan" battalion, the 
"Glathik" battalion, and the "Brandjangan" battalion, and Nata' himself was mur­
dered in the area of Suruhwadang in southern Blitar.77 What Nata' had said was 
so simple and clear. And if we look at the level of his intelligence, and especially 
if  we remember that he was a former electrical worker, I believe he said the truth 
of what had happened. Perhaps he even copied Musso's own formulation. In 
Nata's words there were three elements that I always remember: Move units into 
the occupied zones, fight actively, and "will be recognized by the people."
After that, I was moved to Penghela Rakjat78 in Magelang. By then Magelang 
had become a city of refugees, because so many had poured in from Semarang. At 
night it looked very lively because of all the little flickering lamps. The refugees 
from the north coast would be selling food, "Atom" spectacles, "Atom" combs, 
clothing, and CP drill pants, goods they had been smuggling in from the occupied 
zone.* In Magelang I stayed at the home of Sojas, former minister for food sup­
plies during the Amir Cabinet. He was a very simple man; and every evening 
commanders of Lasjkar Rakjat companies or sections would gather at his house.
At that period Magelang was the headquarters of the Central Java Resistance 
Council, and also of the central headquarters o f the Lasjkar Rakjat led by Ir. 
Sakirman, also known as the Central Java Lasjkar Rakjat, as opposed to the West 
Java Lasjkar Rakjat. Originally one, they had split because the West Java Lasjkar 
Rakjat, led by Chaerul Saleh, Armunanto,and Sidik Kertapati, had rejected Ling- 
gadjati.
After I'd arrived, I noticed that for several successive nights many of these 
Lasjkar Rakjat commanders didn't show up. Some days later I got wind of the 
fact that Sugiri, commander of the "Tenggor Regiment" had headed off to Temang- 
gung, in the direction of the Demarcation Line. Non-Lasjkar Rakjat elements fol­
lowed suit. The Pesindo battalion led by Major Mahmud (the former Pesindo of 
Pekalongan), which was normally under the Central Java Command, had also gone 
off to Temanggung close by the Demarcation Line. It was then that I remembered 
what Maj. Gen. Sudradjad, Soepeno, and Nata' had told me, the gist of which was
* In Republican areas, articles made of plastic were something quite new, only 
appearing after the war. The people coined the term "atom" for these articles.
So in those days, as a result of smuggling from the occupied zone, a whole lot of 
"Atom" spectacles, "Atom" combs, and "Atom" belts—all made o f plastic—showed 
up [in Republican territory].
77. Surachmad's troops are also widely believed to have been responsible for the 
killing of Tan Malaka in February 1949.
78. Penghela Rakjat, leftwing newspaper published in Magelang, identified with 
Pesindo and the Central Java People's Militia.
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essentially the same. In his speech before a mass rally in the alun2 of Madiun at 
the beginning of September Musso had said: "We no longer recognize either the 
cease-fire agreement or Renville." This concept of Musso's was made still more 
explicit in the text of the resolution "A New Road for the Republic of Indonesia." 
The occupied zone was raised to a strategic level. It was no longer just a part, 
and a small part, of the defense section, but became a section all on its own, in 
which it was explained that the PKI intended to intensify its activity in Dutch- 
occupied territory.
The background to this concept of Musso's, which for some of the FDR leaders 
was a real "new look," was the idea that the pockets which had been emptied of 
army forces should now be refilled with units oriented towards the people. The 
withdrawal of the regular army from the pockets meant that there was in essence 
a vacuum of power in the Dutch-occupied zone. Dutch power did not reach down 
to the villages in all areas, while the Republic’ s power was paralyzed [ lumpuh] 
because of the withdrawal of troops from the base areas.
The intensification of Dutch patrols did not essentially change this situation, 
for,with only 240,000 colonial troops, the Dutch could only occupy the larger 
towns, and were incapable of territorial consolidation. Such conditions were ideal 
for developing long-range people's war. For the time being it would be a war o f 
attrition, i . e . , at this strategically defense stage, seizing weapons* rather than 
towns, attracting the people, and, where the conditions permitted, setting up ad­
ministrative units at the village or kecamatan [subdistrict] level. Meanwhile in 
Republican territory only small units would be left behind, for routine purposes, 
including tactical needs,or simply as support staff. The whole concept, however, 
would only work effectively if the conditio qua non [sic] of a unified command 
were first achieved. And this would only be possible if a fusion congress of the 
three workers' parties in the FDR were held, and, underneath, the military units 
under the banners of Pesindo, the Lasjkar Buruh [Workers' Lasjkar], the Lasjkar 
Merah [Red Lasjkar] ,79 and the Lasjkar Rakjat were reorganized into a single 
command.
The necessary outcome of the realization of this concept would be that the 
occupied zone, which, after the withdrawal of the army, was regarded by the 
Dutch as stable, would again become unstable. The no-man's-land would gradu­
ally become Republican territory in a newer, deeper sense. Thus the cease-fire 
agreement would automatically become paralyzed and the Renville Agreement 
annulled, since there would now be a casus belli [sic]. The Hatta Government by 
no means failed to understand these indications. A casus belli, whereby at the 
very least a part of the rakyat would not be behind it , since popularity without 
organization is Active, would make it possible that further developments would 
occur outside the control of its leadership. Accordingly, steps were required to 
counteract this concept. The steps taken were military repression against Madiun, 
based on reports "which may or may not be" true, followed almost simultaneously 
by meetings between Hatta and Stikker, the Dutch foreign minister, at Kaliurang, 
which produced the Hatta-Stikker memorandum [agreeing] to form a "gemeenschap-
* "Who says there are no weapons? There are weapons in the hands of the Dutch 
troops, and those we must seize," Musso's speech before the mass meeting in the 
northern alun2 of Yogyakarta.
79. The Lasjkar Buruh and Lasjkar Merah were rather small and weak paramili­
tary organizations affiliated with, respectively, the Indonesian Labor Party and 
the PKI.
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pelijke gendarmerie [ joint police force]."*  The gemeenschappelijke gendarmerie 
in this context was a political followup, once Hatta felt confident that the military 
operations in Madiun were basically "successful." Thus it is quite clear that the 
Hatta-Stikker agreement to form a "joint police force" was none other than a 
countermove to the concept of creating a casus belli which would paralyze the 
cease-fire and Renville agreements.
I became still more convinced of this picture of events when in 1951 I came 
down into Yogyakarta from Sawangan (on the western slopes of the Merapi-Merbabu 
complex) and found in the reporters' mess a copy of the magazine Mutiara, edited 
by Mochtar Lubis. There I found the diary of Suripno entitled "Why We Lost." It 
seems that this diary was confiscated by the military before Suripno was liquidated 
along with Amir Sjarifuddin, Sardjono, Harjono, Djokosujono, Maruto Darusman, 
Sukarno, Ronomarsono, Oei Gee Hwat, Katamhadi, and D. Mangku in the village of 
Ngalihan.80
I heard that these notes were turned over to Mochtar Lubis by Sribudoyo who'd 
then come in from Surakarta.81 82* The notes had been made, if I'm not mistaken, at 
a meeting in Bantar and in Pulung, after Amir Sjarifuddin had abandoned Madiun. 
Their contents were very good, the only pity was that there was too much personal 
comment by Mochtar Lubis. It's been a long time since I read these notes, and all 
I remember now is their conclusion, where Suripno said, quite frankly: "We were 
not prepared to deal with this situation," meaning that he admitted that the Madiun 
Affair was not part of his mental preparation.
Later on, in the 1950s, in Jakarta, I heard that a French writer wrote a book 
called "Night in Sarangan." I forget his name (Roger Valian?). In it he said that 
the Madiun Affair had been set up a long time beforehand at a meeting of Republi­
can and American leaders in Sarangan.85 But I bring this up only as an additional 
illustration in support of my belief that the Madiun Affair was not at all part o f the 
alternative policy envisioned by Musso; rather, the alternative that he considered 
very seriously was raising the armed struggle in the Dutch-occupied zone to the 
strategic level. For it was generally accepted at that time, not just within the FDR 
(including the Pesindo), but in much wider circles, that once a casus belli had 
occurred, Sukarno and Hatta would not be able to control the situation. But the 
masses' need for the political leadership provided by these two figures counterbal­
anced their weakness in the military sphere. Soepeno, who, when Bung Kamo was 
interned in Bengkulu by the Dutch along with his wife and children, shared that 
internment, on one occasion wrote quite straightforwardly about this. While the
* This memorandum was leaked, and I later heard from both Bung Karno and Bung 
Hatta that the leak came from Dr. Tjoa Sik Ien, who was then officially a member 
of the Indonesian delegation,or a representative of Indonesia, at the UN. He was 
recalled and eventually replaced by Mr. Roem.
80. Some of those mentioned here as being executed have already been referred 
to earlier. The others were middle- and upper-level FDR leaders of various 
stripes.
81. Mochtar Lubis, well-known publicist and novelist, popularly associated with 
the leaders of the Indonesian Socialist Party. Sribudoyo, a young leader of the 
Student Army (Tentera Peladjar) in the Yogyakarta area at the time.
82. This refers to the book by Roger Vailland, Boroboudour, published in 1951.
Vailland, a prize-winning novelist, was also a member of the French Communist
Party. Sarangan is an attractive lake resort on the eastern slopes of Mt. Lawu in
East Java.
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fire of the revolution was still raging, in 1946, Nico Palar,83 84a member of the 
Dutch Lower House and representative of the Partai van der Arbeid, arrived in 
the Republican capital of Yogyakarta and met with Bung Karno. As they parted 
at the end of the meeting, Bung Karno said: "If the Dutch attack Republican ter­
ritory I will lead the guerrilla war myself." "Impossible," was Soepeno's answer 
to this statement o f Bung Kamo. He went on: "How could Bung Kamo want or be 
able to lead a guerrilla war, when he can't even bear to see a chicken's head cut 
off?" This reaction of Soepeno was written down in a special issue of Revolusioner 
for August 1947, in commemoration of the Proclamation of Independence. What 
were the reactions to this article of Soepeno? From Madiun appeared Sumarsono 
and Bambang Kaslan. e>t They leaked a written order from the Kelaskaran Council 
of the Center and the Outer Islands, signed by Maj. Gen. Djokosujono,85 ordering 
that Soepeno be arrested and "stashed" away in Madiun. This episode reflected inter­
nal contradictions in the FDR that could not be quickly overcome. The way out 
was for Soepeno quietly to disappear from Yogyakarta with a Pesindo company 
from East Java, which, equipped with one mortar and one machine-gun, set up a 
defense sector in the village of Sanden on the coast south of Yogyakarta. This 
kind of situation showed at the same time how complex were the internal contradic­
tions within the FDR before Musso arrived. Naturally Djokosujono's orders did 
not originate from Bung Karno. Bung Kamo was too humanistic for that. Both 
towards his political opponents, and towards people who criticized him. And Djo­
kosujono himself was only carrying out orders. He issued this command on the 
instructions of Bung Amir who himself got the order from the FDR "inner circle." 
The complications simply reflected the struggle between different ideas and con­
ceptions within the body of the FDR before Musso arrived, and which had not yet 
found their [correct] conceptual formulation. At the same time, most of this 
struggle over ideas and conceptions was kept within each component member of 
the Sajap Kiri. But gradually the frameworks of the struggle widened, once Amir 
Sjarifuddin resigned as prime minister and the Sajap Kiri became the FDR. Pre­
viously, the organization [Sajap Kiri] had been mainly a means of communication 
between individuals or representatives o f the FDR [sic] in the government. But 
now, much of the planning and execution of the FDR's political line was hammered 
out within the FDR [as a whole], with the result that the struggle between various 
concepts, which had once been contained within the organizational framework of 
the FDR's [Sajap Kiri's] member organizations, came more into the open. In this 
context, Musso's arrival provided an avenue for the crystallization of various con­
ceptions that in fact already existed. It was this situation that provided the con­
ditions whereby Musso found little difficulty in formulating an acceptable new 
political line. It should also be stated that Musso's very brief mission would prob­
ably have had greater success if he had been able to attract a majority of the 
leadership cadres of the GRR, which included the Murba Party and Akoma, into
83. Palar, of Menadonese origin, was then living in Holland, and active in the 
Dutch Labor Party. He came to Indonesia to help build personal bridges between 
the Labor Party leaders and the Republican authorities.
84. Kaslan and Sumarsono were both Pesindo leaders from East Java, close to 
Amir Sjarifuddin. It is likely that they were angered by what could have been 
read as a remark designed to create divisions between the President and the then 
prime minister of Indonesia.
85. Djokosujono (not to be confused with Djokosudjono) was a top-level military 
officer with very close ties to Amir Sjarifuddin and the left. He was executed 
along with Amir in December 1948.
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a united front against Dutch colonialism. But this would only have been a real 
possibility if Musso had refrained from making an issue o f Trotskyism. In that 
way, the Solo affair could have been localized, and special attention could have 
been focused on the struggle against Dutch colonialism, filling the vacuum in the 
occupied zone, and raising the struggle o f the people in the territory occupied 
by the Dutch to the level of strategy.
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